Tennessee code § 36-4-101. Grounds for divorce
from bonds of matrimony.
(a) The following are causes of divorce from the bonds of matrimony:
(1) Either party, at the time of the contract, was
and still is naturally impotent and incapable of procreation;
(2) Either party has knowingly entered into a second marriage,
in violation of a previous marriage, still subsisting;
(3) Either party has committed adultery;
(4) Willful or malicious
desertion or absence of either party, without a reasonable cause, for one (1) whole year;
(5) Being convicted of any crime
that, by the laws of the state, renders the party infamous;
(6) Being convicted of a crime that, by the laws of the state,
is declared to be a felony, and sentenced to confinement in the penitentiary;
(7) Either party has attempted the life of
the other, by poison or any other means showing malice;
(8) Refusal, on the part of a spouse, to remove with that person's
spouse to this state, without a reasonable cause, and being willfully absent from the spouse residing in Tennessee for two
(2) years;
(9) The woman was pregnant at the time of the marriage, by another person, without the knowledge of the husband;
(10) Habitual drunkenness or abuse of narcotic drugs of either party, when the spouse has contracted
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(11) The husband or wife
is guilty of such cruel and inhuman treatment or conduct towards the spouse as renders cohabitation unsafe and improper,
which may also be referred to in pleadings as inappropriate marital conduct;
(12) The husband or wife
has offered such indignities to the spouse's person as to render the spouse's position intolerable, and thereby forced the
spouse to withdraw;
(13) The husband or wife has abandoned the spouse or turned the spouse out of doors for no just cause,
and has refused or neglected to provide for the spouse while having the ability to so provide;
(14) Irreconcilable differences
between the parties; and
(15) For a continuous period of two (2) or more years that commenced prior to or after April 18,
1985, both parties have lived in separate residences, have not cohabited as man and wife during such period, and there are
no minor children of the parties.
(b) A complaint or petition for divorce on any ground for divorce listed in this section
must have been on file for sixty (60) days before being heard if the parties have no unmarried child under eighteen (18)
years of age, and must have been on file at least ninety (90) days before being heard if the parties have an unmarried child
under eighteen (18) years of age. The sixty-day or ninety-day period shall commence on the date the complaint or petition
is filed.
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Tennessee code § 36-4-102. Legal separation.
(a) A party who alleges grounds for divorce from the bonds of matrimony may, as an alternative to filing a complaint for
divorce, file a complaint for legal separation. Such complaint shall set forth the grounds for legal separation in substantially
the language of § 36-4-101 and pray only for legal separation or for such other and further relief to which complainant
may think to be entitled. The other party may deny the existence of grounds for divorce but, unless the other party specifically
objects to the granting of an order of legal separation, the court shall declare the parties to be legally separated.
(b)
If the other party specifically objects to legal separation, the court may, after a hearing, grant an order of legal separation,
notwithstanding such objections if grounds are established pursuant to § 36-4-101. The court also has the power to grant
an absolute divorce to either party where there
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has been an order of legal separation
for more than two (2) years upon a petition being filed by either party that sets forth the original order for
legal separation and that the parties have not become reconciled. The court granting the divorce shall make a final and complete
adjudication of the support and property rights of the parties. However, nothing in this subsection (b) shall preclude the
court from granting an absolute divorce before the two-year period has expired. (c) Legal separation shall not affect the
bonds of matrimony but shall permit the parties to cease matrimonial cohabitation. The court may provide for matters such
as child custody, visitation, support and property issues during legal separation upon motion by either party or by agreement
of the parties.
(d) Notwithstanding this section, a party who can establish grounds for divorce from the bonds of matrimony
pursuant to § 36-4-101 shall be entitled to an absolute divorce pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.
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Tennessee code § 36-4-103. Irreconcilable differences — Procedure.
(a) (1) In all divorces sought because of irreconcilable differences between the parties, if the defendant is a nonresident,
personal service may be effectuated by service upon the secretary of state pursuant to the provisions of § 20-2-215.
(2) In lieu of service of process, the defendant may enter into a written notarized marital dissolution agreement with plaintiff
that makes specific reference to a pending divorce by a court and docket number, or states that the defendant is aware that
one will be filed in this state and that the defendant waives further service and waives filing an answer to the complaint.
Such waiver of service shall be valid for a period of one hundred eighty (180) days from the date the last party signs the
agreement. The agreement may include the obligation and payment of alimony, in solido or in futuro, to either of the parties,
any other provision of the law notwithstanding. The signing of such an agreement shall be in lieu of service of process for
the period such waiver is valid and shall constitute a general appearance before the court and answer that shall give the
court personal jurisdiction over the defendant, and constitute a default judgment for the purpose of granting a divorce on
the grounds of irreconcilable differences.
(3) No divorce heretofore granted shall be invalid because the agreement was signed
and notarized or acknowledged prior to filing under prior law before the action was filed.
(b) No divorce shall be granted
on the ground of irreconcilable differences unless the court affirmatively finds in its decree that the parties have made
adequate and sufficient provision by written agreement for the custody and maintenance of any children of that marriage and
for the equitable settlement of any property rights between the parties. If the court does not affirmatively find that the
agreement is sufficient or equitable, the cause shall be continued by the court to allow further disposition by the petitioner.
If both parties are present at the hearing, they may, at that time, ratify any amendments the court may have to the agreement.
The amended agreement shall then become a part of the decree. The agreement shall be incorporated in the decree or incorporated
by reference, and such decree may be modified as other decrees for divorce.
(c) (1) Bills for divorce on the ground of irreconcilable
differences must have been on file for sixty (60) days before being heard if the parties have no unmarried child under eighteen |
(18) years of age, and must have been on file at least ninety (90)
days before being heard if the parties have an unmarried child under eighteen (18) years of age. The sixty-day or ninety-day
period bills for divorce that must be on file shall commence on the date the original bill was filed and not on the date
the bill was amended to include the ground of irreconcilable differences. (2) A divorce decree or order issued prior to March
22, 1996, in which the hearing for such divorce occurred before the specified time periods required by this subsection (c),
shall remain valid and the parties shall remain divorced. Likewise, all other issues resolved in the divorce decree, order
or agreement, such as distribution of marital property, alimony, child support and custody, shall remain valid and in full
force and effect.
(d) (1) A bill of complaint for divorce where the respondent has been personally served or acknowledged
as set out in subsection (a), which includes the ground of irreconcilable differences, may be taken as confessed and a final
decree entered thereon, as in other cases and without corroborative proof or testimony, the provisions of §§ 36-4-107 and 36-4-114 to the
contrary notwithstanding.
2) For purposes of this section, “without (corroborative proof or testimony” means
that the petitioner shall not be required to testify as to the material facts constituting irreconcilable differences or
any attempts to reconcile such differences.
(e) If there has been a contest or denial of the grounds of irreconcilable differences,
no divorce shall be granted on the grounds of irreconcilable differences. However, a divorce may be granted on the grounds
of irreconcilable differences where there has been a contest or denial, if a properly executed marital dissolution agreement
is presented to the court.
(f) Irreconcilable differences may be asserted as a sole ground for divorce or as an alternate
ground for divorce with any other cause for divorce set out in § 36-4-101 or § 36-4-102.
(g) Notwithstanding any
law to the contrary requiring mediation, the filing with the court of a properly executed marital dissolution agreement and,
if there are minor children of the marriage, a properly executed parenting plan shall serve to remove any requirement that
the parties shall attend mediation. If the court does not approve either the marital dissolution agreement or the parenting
plan, then any requirement to attend mediation shall be reinstated as of the date of the court's rejection of either agreement.
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Tennessee code § 36-4-121.
Distribution of marital property. Divorce settlement
(a) (1) In all actions for divorce or legal separation, the court having jurisdiction thereof may, upon request of either
party, and prior to any determination as to whether it is appropriate to order the support and maintenance of one (1) party
by the other, equitably divide, distribute or assign the marital property between the parties without regard to marital fault
in proportions as the court deems just.
(2) In all actions for legal separation, the court, in its discretion, may equitably
divide, distribute, or assign the marital property in whole or in part, or reserve the division or assignment of marital
property until a later time. If the court makes a final distribution of marital property at the time of the decree of legal
separation, any after-acquired property is separate property.
(3) To this end, the court shall be empowered to effectuate
its decree by divesting and reinvesting title to such property and, where deemed necessary, to order a sale of such property
and to order the proceeds divided between the parties. (A) Any auction sale of property ordered pursuant to this section
shall be conducted in accordance with the provisions of title 35, chapter 5.
(B) The court may order the provisions of title
35, chapter 5, to apply to any sale ordered by the court pursuant to this section.
(C) The court, in its discretion, may
impose any additional conditions or procedures upon the sale of property in divorce cases as are reasonably designed to ensure
that such property is sold for its fair market value.
(b) For purposes of this chapter: (1) (A) “Marital property” means
all real and personal property, both tangible and intangible, acquired by either or both spouses during the course of the
marriage up to the date of the final divorce hearing and owned by either or both spouses as of the date of filing of a complaint
for divorce, except in the case of fraudulent conveyance in anticipation of filing, and including any property to which a
right was acquired up to the date of the final divorce hearing, and valued as of a date as near as reasonably possible to
the final divorce hearing date. In the case of a complaint for legal separation, the court may make a final disposition of
the marital property either at the time of entering an order of legal separation or at the time of entering a final divorce
decree, if any. If the marital property is divided as part of the order of legal separation, any property acquired by a spouse
thereafter is deemed separate property of that spouse. All marital property shall be valued as of a date as near as possible
to the date of entry of the order finally dividing the marital property.
(B) “Marital property” includes income
from, and any increase in value during the marriage of, property determined to be separate property in accordance with subdivision
(b)(2) if each party substantially contributed to its preservation and appreciation, and the value of vested and unvested
pension, vested and unvested stock option rights, retirement or other fringe benefit rights relating to employment that accrued
during the period of the marriage.
(C) “Marital property” includes recovery in personal injury, workers' compensation,
social security disability actions, and other similar actions for the following: wages lost during the marriage, reimbursement
for medical bills incurred and paid with marital property, and property damage to marital property.
(D) As used in this subsection
(b), “substantial contribution” may include, but not be limited to, the direct or indirect contribution of a
spouse as homemaker, wage earner, parent or family financial manager, together with such other factors as the court having
jurisdiction thereof may determine.
(E) Property shall be considered marital property as defined by this subsection (b) for
the sole purpose of dividing assets upon divorce or legal separation and for no other purpose; and assets distributed as
marital property will not be considered as income for child support or alimony purposes, except to the extent the asset will
create additional income after the division.
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(2) “Separate property” means:
(A) All real and personal
property owned by a spouse before marriage, including, but not limited to, assets held in individual retirement accounts
(IRAs) as that term is defined in the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended;
(B) Property acquired in exchange for property
acquired before the marriage;
(C) Income from and appreciation of property owned by a spouse before marriage except when
characterized as marital property under subdivision (b)(1);
(D) Property acquired by a spouse at any time by gift, bequest,
devise or descent;
(E) Pain and suffering awards, victim of crime compensation awards, future medical expenses, and future
lost wages; and
(F) Property acquired by a spouse after an order of legal separation where the court has made a final disposition
of property.
(c) In making equitable division of marital property, the court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) The duration of the marriage;
(2) The age, physical and mental health, vocational skills, employability, earning capacity,
estate, financial liabilities and financial needs of each of the parties;
(3) The tangible or intangible contribution by
one (1) party to the education, training or increased earning power of the other party;
(4) The relative ability of each
party for future acquisitions of capital assets and income;
(5) The contribution of each party to the acquisition, preservation,
appreciation, depreciation or dissipation of the marital or separate property, including the contribution of a party to the
marriage as homemaker, wage earner or parent, with the contribution of a party as homemaker or wage earner to be given the
same weight if each party has fulfilled its role;
(6) The value of the separate property of each party;
(7) The estate of
each party at the time of the marriage;
(8) The economic circumstances of each party at the time the division of property
is to become effective;
(9) The tax consequences to each party, costs associated with the reasonably foreseeable sale of
the asset, and other reasonably foreseeable expenses associated with the asset;
(10) The amount of social security benefits
available to each spouse; and
(11) Such other factors as are necessary to consider the equities between the parties.
(d)
The court may award the family home and household effects, or the right to live therein and use the household effects for
a reasonable period, to either party, but shall give special consideration to a spouse having physical custody of a child
or children of the marriage.
(e) (1) The court may impose a lien upon the marital real property assigned to a party, or upon
such party's separate real property, or both, as security for the payment of child support.
(2) The court may impose a lien
upon the marital real property assigned to a party as security for the payment of spouse support or payment pursuant to property
division.
(f) (1) If, in making equitable distribution of marital property, the court determines that the distribution of
an interest in a business, corporation or profession would be contrary to law, the court may make a distributive award of
money or other property in order to achieve equity between the parties. The court, in its discretion, may also make a distributive
award of money or other property to supplement, facilitate or effectuate a distribution of marital property.
(2) The court
may provide that any distributive award payable over a period of time be secured by a lien on specific property.
(g) (1)
Nothing in this section shall be construed to prevent the affirmation, ratification and incorporation in a decree of an agreement
between the parties regarding the division of property.
(2) Nothing in this section shall affect validity of an antenuptial
agreement that is enforceable under § 36-3-501.
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Tennessee code § 36-5-101.
Decree for support of children — Modification
(a) (1) Upon dissolution of a marriage, whether dissolved absolutely or by a perpetual or temporary decree of separation,
the court may make an order and decree for the suitable support and maintenance of the children by either spouse or out of
such spouse's property, according to the nature of the case and the circumstances of the parties, the order or decree to
remain in the court's control.
(2) Courts having jurisdiction of the subject matter and of the parties are hereby expressly
authorized to provide for the future support of the children, in proper cases, by fixing some definite amount or amounts
to be paid in monthly, semimonthly, or weekly installments, or otherwise, as circumstances may warrant, and such awards,
if not paid, may be enforced by any appropriate process of the court having jurisdiction, including levy of execution.
(3)
In interstate cases, jurisdiction to modify, alter or enforce orders or decrees for the support of children shall be determined
in accordance with the provisions of parts 20-29 of this chapter. In intrastate cases, jurisdiction to modify, alter or enforce
orders or decrees for the support of children shall be determined in accordance with the provisions of parts 30 and 31 of
this chapter. (4) As used in this chapter, “order,” where the context requires, includes an order concerning
child or medical support issued pursuant to an administrative proceeding in any other state.
(5) In establishing or enforcing
any duty of support under this chapter, the court shall give full faith and credit to all paternity determinations of any
other state or territory, made pursuant to a voluntary acknowledgment or pursuant to any administrative or judicial process.
(6) A voluntary acknowledgment of paternity that is completed under the provisions of § 68-3-203(g), § 68-3-302,
or § 68-3-305(b), or under similar provisions of another state or government, when certified by the state registrar
or other governmental or institutional entity maintaining the record of the acknowledgment, shall be a basis for establishing
a support order without requiring any further proceedings to establish paternity.
(7) The state of Tennessee, its officers,
employees, agents or contractors, any counties, county officials, the clerks of any court, or any Title IV-D child support
enforcement agency shall not be liable, in any case, to compensate any person for repayment of child support paid or for
any other costs, as a result of the rescission pursuant to § 24-7-113 of any voluntary acknowledgment, or the rescission
of any orders of legitimation, paternity, or support.
(8) When a court having jurisdiction determines child support pursuant
to the Tennessee child support guidelines, based on either the actual income or the court's findings of an obligor's ability
to earn income, the final child support order shall create an inference in any subsequent proceeding that the obligor has
the ability to pay the ordered amount until such time as the obligor files an application with the court to modify the ordered
amount.
(b) (1) Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, neither the department of human services, nor
any Title IV-D child support contractor of the department, nor any recipient of public assistance in this or any other state
or territory, nor any applicant for either public
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assistance in this or any other state or territory or for Title
IV-D child support services from the department or any other Title IV-D agency in this or any other state or territory, shall
be required to demonstrate to a court or administrative tribunal that the caretaker of the child for whom child support
is sought is vested with any more than physical custody of the subject child or children, in order to have standing to petition
for child support from the legal parent of the child or children for whom support is sought, or to seek enforcement or modification
of any existing orders involving such child or children.
(2) Legal custody of a child to whom a child support obligation
is owed shall not be a prerequisite to the initiation of any support action or to the enforcement or modification of any
support obligation in such cases, whether or not the obligation has been assigned to this state or any other state or territory
by operation of law. (c) (1) The court shall set a specific amount that is due each month, to be paid in one (1) or more
payments as the court directs. In making any decree or order pursuant to this section, the court shall consider the provisions
of § 34-1-102(b). Unless the court finds otherwise, each order made under this section shall contain the current address
of the parties.
(2) (A) The order or decree of the court may provide that the payments for the support of such child or children
shall be paid either to the clerk of the court or directly to the spouse, or other person awarded the custody of the child
or children; provided, however, that:
(i) The court shall order that all child support payments based upon an income assignment
issued by the clerk be paid to the clerk of the court, except as set forth in subdivision (c)(2)(A)(ii), for child support
cases that are subject to the provisions for central collection and disbursement pursuant to § 36-5-116; and
(ii) In
all Title IV-D child support cases in which payment of child support is to be made by income assignment, or otherwise, and
in all cases where payments made by income assignment based upon support orders entered on or after January 1, 1994, that
are not Title IV-D support cases, but must be made to the central collection and disbursement unit as provided by § 36-5-116,
and, except as may otherwise be allowed by § 36-5-501(a)(2)(B), the court shall only order that the support payments
be made to the central collection and disbursement unit pursuant to § 36-5-116. No agreement by the parties in a parenting
plan, either temporary or permanent, entered pursuant to the provisions of chapter 6, part 4 of this title, or any other
agreement of the parties or order of the court, except as may otherwise be allowed by § 36-5-501(a)(2)(B), shall alter
the requirements for payment to the central collection and disbursement unit as required by § 36-5-116, and any provision
of any parenting plan, agreement or court order providing for any other payment procedure contrary to the requirements of § 36-5-116,
except as may otherwise be allowed by § 36-5-501(a)(2)(B), whether or not approved by the court, shall be void and of
no effect. No credit shall be given by the court, the court clerk or the department of human services, for child support
payments required by the support order that are made in contravention of such requirements; provided, however, that the department
may make any necessary adjustments to the balances owed to account for changes in the Title IV-D or central collection and
disbursement status of the support case.
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Tennessee code § 36-6-101.
Decree for custody and support of child — Enforcement
(a) (1) In a suit for annulment, divorce or separate maintenance, where the custody of a minor child or minor children
is a question, the court may, notwithstanding a decree for annulment, divorce or separate maintenance is denied, award the
care, custody and control of such child or children to either of the parties to the suit or to both parties in the instance
of joint custody or shared parenting, or to some suitable person, as the welfare and interest of the child or children may
demand, and the court may decree that suitable support be made by the natural parents or those who stand in the place of
the natural parents by adoption. Such decree shall remain within the control of the court and be subject to such changes
or modification as the exigencies of the case may require.
(2) (A) (i) Except as provided in this subdivision (a)(2)(A),
neither a preference nor a presumption for or against joint legal custody, joint physical custody or sole custody is established,
but the court shall have the widest discretion to order a custody arrangement that is in the best interest of the child.
Unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, there is a presumption that joint custody is in
the best interest of a minor child where the parents have agreed to joint custody or so agree in open court at a hearing
for the purpose of determining the custody of the minor child. For the purpose of assisting the court in making a determination
whether an award of joint custody is appropriate, the court may direct that an investigation be conducted. The burden of
proof necessary to modify an order of joint custody at a subsequent proceeding shall be by a preponderance of the evidence.
(ii) Unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, there is a presumption that custody shall not
be awarded to a parent who has been convicted of a criminal offense under title 39, chapter 13, part 5, against a child less
than eighteen (18) years of age.
(iii) The provisions of subdivision (a)(2)(A)(ii) shall apply only to persons who are convicted
on or after July 1, 2006. Subdivision (a)(2)(A)(ii) and this subdivision (a)(2)(A)(iii) shall not be construed to prevent
a parent from being granted visitation with the child; provided, however, that any visitation shall be supervised. (iv) If
it is determined by the court, based upon a prior order or reliable evidence, that a parent has willfully abandoned a child
for a period of eighteen (18) months, as the term is used in § 36-6-406(a)(1), then, unless the court finds by clear
and convincing evidence to the contrary, the abandoning parent's residential time, as provided in the permanent or temporary
parenting plan or other court order, shall be limited. This subdivision (a)(2)(A)(iv) shall not be construed to prevent such
a parent from being granted limited visitation with the child. Nothing in this subdivision (a)(2)(A)(iv) shall be construed
to apply to children in the legal custody of the department of children's services.
(B) If the issue before the court is
a modification of the court's prior decree pertaining to custody, the petitioner must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
a material change in circumstance. A material change of circumstance does not require a showing of a substantial risk of
harm to the child. A material change of circumstance may include, but is not limited to, failures to adhere to the parenting
plan or an order of custody and visitation or circumstances that make the parenting plan no longer in the best interest of
the child.
(i) In each contested case, the court shall make such a finding as to the reason and the facts that constitute
the basis for the custody determination.
(ii) Nothing contained within the provisions of this subdivision (a)(2) shall interfere
with the requirement that parties to an action for legal separation, annulment, absolute divorce or separate maintenance
incorporate a parenting plan into the final decree or decree modifying an existing custody order.
(iii) Nothing in this subsection
(a) shall imply a mandatory modification to the child support order.
(C) If the issue before the court is a modification
of the court's prior decree pertaining to a residential parenting schedule, then the petitioner must prove by a preponderance
of the evidence a material change of circumstance affecting the child's best interest. A material change of circumstance
does not require a showing of a substantial risk of harm to the child. A material change of circumstance for purposes of
modification of a residential parenting schedule may include, but is not limited to, significant changes in the needs of
the child over time, which may include changes relating to age; significant changes in the parent's living or working condition
that significantly affect parenting; failure to adhere to the parenting plan; or other circumstances making a change in the
residential parenting time in the best interest of the child.
(3) Except when the court finds it not to be in the best interests
of the affected child, each order pertaining to the custody or possession of a child arising from an action for absolute
divorce, divorce from bed and board or annulment shall grant to each parent the rights listed in subdivisions (a)(3)(A)-(a)(3)(F)
during periods when the child is not in that parent's possession
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or shall incorporate such rights by reference to a prior
order. Other orders pertaining to custody or possession of a child may contain the rights listed in subdivisions (a)(3)(A)-(a)(3)(F).
The referenced rights are as follows:
(A) The right to unimpeded telephone conversations with the child at least twice a
week at reasonable times and for reasonable durations; (B) The right to send mail to the child that the other parent shall
not open or censor;
(C) The right to receive notice and relevant information as soon as practicable but within twenty-four
(24) hours of any event of hospitalization, major illness or death of the child; (D) The right to receive directly from the
child's school records, names of teachers, class schedules, standardized test scores, and any other records customarily made
available to parents, upon written request that includes a current mailing address and upon payment of reasonable costs of
duplicating;
(E) Unless otherwise provided by law, the right to receive copies of the child's medical, health or other treatment
records directly from the physician or health care provider who provided such treatment or health care upon written request
that contains a current mailing address and upon payment of reasonable costs of duplication; provided, that no person who
receives the mailing address of a parent as a result of this requirement shall provide such address to the other parent or
a third person;
(F) The right to be free of unwarranted derogatory remarks made about such parent or such parent's family
by the other parent to or in the presence of the child;
(G) The right to be given at least forty-eight (48) hours notice,
whenever possible, of all extra-curricular activities, and the opportunity to participate or observe, including, but not
limited to, the following:
(i) School activities;
(ii) Athletic activities;
(iii) Church activities; and
(iv) Other activities
as to which parental participation or observation would be appropriate; (H) The right to receive from the other parent, in
the event the other parent leaves the state with the minor child or children for more than two (2) days, an itinerary including
telephone numbers for use in the event of an emergency; and
(I) The right of access and participation in education, including
the right of access to the minor child or children for lunch and other activities, on the same basis that is provided to
all parents, provided the participation or access is reasonable and does not interfere with day-to-day operations or with
the child's educational performance. Any of the foregoing rights may be denied in whole or in part to one or both parents
by the court upon a showing that such denial is in the best interests of the child. Nothing herein shall be construed to
prohibit the court from ordering additional rights where the facts and circumstances so require.
(4) Notwithstanding any
common law presumption to the contrary, a finding under § 36-6-106(8), that child abuse, as defined in §§ 39-15-401
or 39-15-402, or child sexual abuse, as defined in § 37-1-602, has occurred within the family shall give rise to a rebuttable
presumption that it is detrimental to the child and not in the best interests of the child to award sole custody, joint legal
or joint physical custody to the perpetrator of such abuse.
(b) Notwithstanding any provision of this section to the contrary,
the party, or parties, or other person awarded custody and control of such child or children shall be entitled to enforce
the provisions of the court's decree concerning the suitable support of such child or children in the appropriate court of
any county in this state in which such child or children reside; provided, that such court shall have divorce jurisdiction,
if service of process is effectuated upon the obligor within this state. Jurisdiction to modify or alter such decree shall
remain in the exclusive control of the court that issued such decree.
(c) Nothing in this chapter shall be construed to alter,
modify or restrict the exclusive jurisdiction of the juvenile court pursuant to § 37-1-103.
(d) It is the legislative
intent that the gender of the party seeking custody shall not give rise to a presumption of parental fitness or cause a presumption
or constitute a factor in favor or against the award of custody to such party.
(e) (1) In an action for dissolution of marriage
involving minor children, or in a post-judgment proceeding involving minor children, if the court finds, on a case by case
basis, that it would be in the best interest of the minor children, the court may on its own motion, or on the motion of
either party, order the parties, excluding the minor children, to attend an educational seminar concerning the effects of
the dissolution of marriage on the children. The program may be divided into sessions, which in the aggregate shall not exceed
four (4) hours in duration. The program shall be educational in nature and not designed for individual therapy.
(2) The fees
or costs of the educational sessions under this section, which shall be reasonable, shall be borne by the parties and may
be assessed by the court as it deems equitable. Fees may be waived upon motion for indigent persons.
(3) No court shall deny
the granting of a divorce from the bonds of matrimony for failure of a party or both parties to attend the educational session.
Refusal to attend the educational session may be punished by contempt and may be considered by the court as evidence of the
parent's lack of good faith in proceedings under part 4 of this chapter.
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Tennessee code § 36-6-108.
Parental relocation
(a) If a parent who is spending intervals of time with a child desires to relocate outside the state or more than one
hundred (100) miles from the other parent within the state, the relocating parent shall send a notice to the other parent
at the other parent's last known address by registered or certified mail. Unless excused by the court for exigent circumstances,
the notice shall be mailed not later than sixty (60) days prior to the move. The notice shall contain the following:
(1)
Statement of intent to move;
(2) Location of proposed new residence;
(3) Reasons for proposed relocation; and
(4) Statement
that the other parent may file a petition in opposition to the move within thirty (30) days of receipt of the notice.
(b)
Unless the parents can agree on a new visitation schedule, the relocating parent shall file a petition seeking to alter visitation.
The court shall consider all relevant factors, including those factors enumerated within subsection (d). The court shall
also consider the availability of alternative arrangements to foster and continue the child's relationship with and access
to the other parent. The court shall assess the costs of transporting the child for visitation and determine whether a deviation
from the child support guidelines should be considered in light of all factors including, but not limited to, additional
costs incurred for transporting the child for visitation.
(c) If the parents are actually spending substantially equal intervals
of time with the child and the relocating parent seeks to move with the child, the other parent may, within thirty (30) days
of receipt of notice, file a petition in opposition to removal of the child. No presumption in favor of or against the request
to relocate with the child shall arise. The court shall determine whether or not to permit relocation of the child based
upon the best interests of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including the following where applicable:
(1) The extent to which visitation rights have been allowed and exercised;
(2) Whether the primary residential parent, once
out of the jurisdiction, is likely to comply with any new visitation arrangement;
(3) The love, affection and emotional ties
existing between the parents and child;
(4) The disposition of the parents to provide the child with food, clothing, medical
care, education and other necessary care and the degree to which a parent has been the primary caregiver;
(5) The importance
of continuity in the child's life and the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory environment;
(6) The
stability of the family unit of the parents;
(7) The mental and physical health of the parents;
(8) The home, school and
community record of the child;
(9) (A) The reasonable preference of the child if twelve (12) years of age or older;
(B) The
court may hear the preference of a younger child upon request. The preferences of older children should normally be given
greater weight than those of younger children;
(10) Evidence of physical or emotional abuse to the child, to the other parent
or to any other person; and
(11) The character and behavior of any other person who resides in or frequents the home of a
parent and such person's interactions with the child.
(d) (1) If the parents are not actually spending substantially equal
intervals of time with the child and the parent spending the greater amount of time with the child proposes to relocate with
the child, the other parent may, within thirty (30) days of receipt of the notice, file a petition in opposition to removal
of the child. The other parent may not attempt to relocate with the child unless expressly authorized to do so by the court
pursuant to a change of custody or primary custodial responsibility. The parent spending the greater amount of time with
the child shall be permitted to relocate with the child unless the court finds:
(A) The relocation does not have a reasonable
purpose;
(B) The relocation would pose a threat of specific and serious harm to the child that outweighs the threat of harm
to the child of a change of custody; or
(C) The parent's motive for relocating with the child is vindictive in that it is
intended to defeat or deter visitation rights of the non-custodial parent or the parent spending less
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time with the child.
(2) Specific and serious harm
to the child includes, but is not limited to, the following:
(A) If a parent wishes to take a child with a serious medical
problem to an area where no adequate treatment is readily available;
(B) If a parent wishes to take a child with specific
educational requirements to an area with no acceptable education facilities;
(C) If a parent wishes to relocate and take
up residence with a person with a history of child or domestic abuse or who is currently abusing alcohol or other drugs;
(D) If the child relies on the parent not relocating who provides emotional support, nurturing and development such that
removal would result in severe emotional detriment to the child;
(E) If the custodial parent is emotionally disturbed or
dependent such that the custodial parent is not capable of adequately parenting the child in the absence of support systems
currently in place in this state, and such support system is not available at the proposed relocation site; or
(F) If the
proposed relocation is to a foreign country whose public policy does not normally enforce the visitation rights of non-custodial
parents, that does not have an adequately functioning legal system or that otherwise presents a substantial risk of specific
and serious harm to the child.
(e) If the court finds one (1) or more of the grounds designated in subsection (d), the court
shall determine whether or not to permit relocation of the child based on the best interest of the child. If the court finds
it is not in the best interests of the child to relocate as defined herein, but the parent with whom the child resides the
majority of the time elects to relocate, the court shall make a custody determination and shall consider all relevant factors
including the following where applicable:
(1) The extent to which visitation rights have been allowed and exercised;
(2)
Whether the primary residential parent, once out of the jurisdiction, is likely to comply with any new visitation arrangement;
(3) The love, affection and emotional ties existing between the parents and child;
(4) The disposition of the parents to
provide the child with food, clothing, medical care, education and other necessary care and the degree to which a parent
has been the primary caregiver;
(5) The importance of continuity in the child's life and the length of time the child has
lived in a stable, satisfactory environment;
(6) The stability of the family unit of the parents;
(7) The mental and physical
health of the parents;
(8) The home, school and community record of the child;
(9) (A) The reasonable preference of the child
if twelve (12) years of age or older;
(B) The court may hear the preference of a younger child upon request. The preferences
of older children should normally be given greater weight than those of younger children;
(10) Evidence of physical or emotional
abuse to the child, to the other parent or to any other person; and
(11) The character and behavior of any other person who
resides in or frequents the home of a parent and such person's interactions with the child.
(f) The court shall consider
the availability of alternative arrangements to foster and continue the child's relationship with and access to the other
parent. The court shall assess the costs of transporting the child for visitation, and determine whether a deviation from
the child support guidelines should be considered in light of all factors including, but not limited to, additional costs
incurred for transporting the child for visitation.
(g) Nothing in this section shall prohibit either parent from petitioning
the court at any time to address issues, such as, but not limited to, visitation, other than a change of custody related
to the move. In the event no petition in opposition to a proposed relocation is filed within thirty (30) days of receipt
of the notice, the parent proposing to relocate with the child shall be permitted to do so.
(h) It is the legislative intent
that the gender of the parent who seeks to relocate for the reason of career, educational, professional, or job opportunity,
or otherwise, shall not be a factor in favor or against the relocation of such parent with the child.
(i) Either parent in
a parental relocation matter may recover reasonable attorney fees and other litigation expenses from the other parent in
the discretion of the court. |
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The Tennessee
Code that appears here may not
include all provisions of Family Law. Some redacting has
occurred. You should consult the TN code or a Tennessee divorce attorney.
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